Unenforceability by Petherbridge, Lee, Ph.D. et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2013 
Unenforceability 
Lee Petherbridge Ph.D. 
Loyola Law School 
Jason Rantanen 
University of Iowa College of Law 
R. Polk Wagner 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, 
Legal Remedies Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, and the Public Law and 
Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Petherbridge, Lee Ph.D.; Rantanen, Jason; and Wagner, R. Polk, "Unenforceability" (2013). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1710. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1710 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 
1751 
Unenforceability 
Lee Petherbridge* 
Jason Rantanen** 
R. Polk Wagner*** 
Abstract 
The patent doctrine of inequitable conduct—which allows a 
patent to be held unenforceable on the basis of misbehavior by the 
applicant during patent prosecution—has been the subject of 
intense criticism from the bench and bar alike. And yet to date 
there has been no systematic attempt to determine whether the 
doctrine is or is not working as theorized. This study fills that gap. 
We evaluate the performance of the inequitable conduct doctrine 
with a novel methodological approach: by empirically 
characterizing the differences between patents found 
unenforceable and several other types of patents (unlitigated, 
litigated, invalid, obvious, and underdisclosed), we use those 
differences to reveal the real-world impact of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine. We find that patents held unenforceable have 
clear hallmarks of risky prosecution behavior, such as longer 
pendency and fewer disclosures of prior art, as compared to all 
other types we studied. These results indicate that the doctrine is 
likely operating better than conventional wisdom would suggest.  
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I. Introduction 
Patents are deeply infused with public interest 
considerations: they are a government grant of power to an 
individual or company to (potentially) affect the marketplace.1 As 
such, most conceptions of the patent system involve a balance 
between private and public rights, and virtually every aspect of 
the patent law is directed toward creating or enforcing that 
balance.2 By punishing the socially detrimental behavior of 
patentees before the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO), the doctrine of inequitable conduct is in some sense no 
different: its conventionally understood purpose is to protect the 
administrative integrity of the patent system.3  
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual 
Property, Antitrust, and Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837 (2007) (discussing 
and defining market power in the intellectual property context). 
 2. See Yaniv Gal, Patent Law in the Antitrust Scope: Between Social 
Advancement and Competitive Impingement, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 367, 405 (2011) (“The disclosure requirement, joined with the enablement 
element, aims to enhance welfare by enabling other manufacturers to replicate 
the patent, once it enters public domain. This preserves an adequate patent-
competition balance.”). 
 3. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1103 (4th ed. 2007) (“The administrative process of the 
U.S. patent system relies on the applicant and the examiner to determine 
whether an invention is patentable, and if so, what its proper scope should be.”). 
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At its core, inequitable conduct emanates from the historic 
equitable doctrine of “unclean hands,” generally stated as “he 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”4 In the 
patent context, the concept is that a patentee may not seek to 
enforce rights that were obtained by “fraud against the public.”5 
For inequitable conduct purposes, fraud against the public is 
defined as abuses of the patent prosecution process. The doctrinal 
rubric asks whether a patent applicant either failed to disclose 
information material to patentability or made misrepresentations 
to the Patent Office that were material to patentability,6 and if 
so, whether the nondisclosures or misrepresentations were made 
with an intent to deceive the Patent Office into allowing patent 
claims to issue.7 Assuming the answers to both the materiality 
and intent inquiries meet threshold levels, a trial judge has the 
discretion to remedy an applicant’s inequitable8 behavior by 
declaring involved patents unenforceable.9 An unenforceable 
patent is effectively useless to the patentee (except as a source of 
                                                                                                     
 4. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 
814 (1945) (“The guiding doctrine in this case is the equitable maxim that ‘he 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’”). 
 5. See id. at 816 (“The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a 
patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing that patent 
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable 
conduct.”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2013) (“A patent by its very nature is affected 
with a public interest. . . . [N]o patent will be granted on an application in 
connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted.”).  
 6. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“Applicants for patents are required to prosecute patent applications in the 
PTO with candor, good faith, and honesty. . . . A breach of this duty constitutes 
inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct includes affirmative misrepresentation 
of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false 
material information.”). 
 7. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1319 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing the standard for determining if misstatements were 
intentional and thus made to deceive). 
 8. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating the process and burden of proof for a showing of 
inequitable conduct).  
 9. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (relevant part en banc) (“When a court has finally 
determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or more claims 
during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered 
unenforceable. We, in banc, reaffirm that rule.”).  
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“prior art”), and importantly, the unenforceability applies to all 
claims of that patent and even closely related patents.10 
In theory, inequitable conduct plays an important role in 
enforcing the relationship between the patentee and the patent 
examiner (who is, of course, acting as an agent for the public). 
The patentee will often be best positioned to know and report 
information relevant to her invention’s patentability, whether 
related to prior art, dates of invention, and the like. Material 
nondisclosure of such information (or misrepresentations) would 
obviously tilt the patent prosecution process unjustifiably in the 
applicant’s favor. And the fact that patent prosecution is 
generally ex parte only reinforces the need for the inequitable 
conduct doctrine. 
Or at least that’s the theory. In recent years, inequitable 
conduct has come under attack, in large measure because of a 
widely held view that the doctrine is over-asserted in patent 
litigation.11 That it might be over-asserted is not altogether 
surprising. First, the remedy of unenforceability is a very 
powerful one—rendering all claims of a patent (and even those in 
related patents) effectively void.12 A defendant who wins on 
inequitable conduct has likely achieved a victory that proving 
invalidity of claims cannot provide in terms of the scope of the 
effect.13 Second, in many cases the information that can be used 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288–
89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can 
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and 
applications in the same technology family.”); Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco 
Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809–12 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (describing how inequitable 
conduct regarding one patent can affect the validity of others that are closely 
related). 
 11. For some examples, see generally Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable 
Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 215, 215 (2010); Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of 
the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 
99 (1993); John F. Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent 
Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988); 
Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of 
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1332 (2009); Melissa F. 
Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, at 
3 (2008). 
 12. See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he remedy for inequitable 
conduct is the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law. . . . [I]nequitable conduct regarding 
any single claim renders the entire patent unenforceable.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 
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to develop a claim of inequitable conduct (typically the 
nondisclosure of prior art) overlaps with the type of information 
that would be used to show invalidity, and yet inequitable 
conduct does not require proof that the invention was actually 
unpatentable.14 Thus, allegations of inequitable conduct have 
been described as a “plague”15 by judges, and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gradually attempted to 
tighten up the standards for finding inequitable conduct—
presumably out of a hope to reduce the incidence of assertions of 
the doctrine.16 The patent bar has also pressed Congress for 
protection from the workings of the doctrine. Congress has 
responded with a supplemental examination provision,17 which 
can be used to cure all but the most extreme forms of inequitable 
conduct.18  
Thus, there is a substantial question of whether the doctrine 
of inequitable conduct is working to advance its theoretical goals 
or is instead an ineffective and costly component of an already-
complex patent enforcement regime. And although a few scholars 
have analyzed the inequitable conduct doctrine empirically, 
                                                                                                     
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (describing inequitable 
conduct as an “atomic bomb” and the wide reaching effects it has on litigation). 
 14. Courts decide issues of patent validity and enforceability separately. 
See, e.g., Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1150 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment of invalidity based solely on 
finding of inequitable conduct). 
 15. See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (“We add one final word: the habit of charging inequitable conduct in 
almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague. . . . [Lawyers] 
destroy the respect for one another’s integrity, . . . that used to make the bar a 
valuable help to the courts in making sound disposition of their cases.”).  
 16. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291–
93 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (describing the efforts of courts to make the standards for 
finding inequitable conduct more stringent); Jason Rantanen & Lee 
Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L. 
& TECH 226, 245–50 (2011–12) (describing the effect of Therasense on patent 
litigation and the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
 17. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 
Stat. 284, 325 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2012)) (“A patent owner may 
request supplemental examination of a patent in the Office to consider, 
reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to the patent . . . .”). 
 18. See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention 
Registration: The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 24, 24–27 (2011) (describing and analyzing the supplemental 
examination provision).  
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nearly all prior work has been directed at the incidence of 
inequitable conduct claims and the end results in litigation and 
thus shines very little light on the relationship between the 
inequitable conduct doctrine and its theoretical role in the patent 
system.19 A prior study by two of us analyzed the doctrine in more 
systematic depth, revealing that determinations of 
unenforceability are typically based on acts that could cause 
patent claims to issue that should not, cause claims to issue that 
are of inappropriate scope, and cause claims to issue in a manner 
or sequence that could unfairly advantage one competitor over 
another.20 Taken together, the prior work can be read to suggest a 
nexus between the doctrine of inequitable conduct and its 
theoretical role in the patent system, but results are more 
suggestive than conclusive. This project seeks to fill that gap. 
Although our research question is the performance of a legal 
doctrine—inequitable conduct—our experimental design is novel 
in approach and does not depend on an analysis of case law. 
Instead, we build several datasets that allow us to compare the 
characteristics of the patents involved in inequitable conduct (and 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Mammen, supra note 11, at 1348–61 (analyzing the 
prevalence of inequitable conduct); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and 
Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 
211–13 (2001) (addressing inequitable conduct among other doctrines when 
comparing patentee win rates and recoveries in cases tried before juries and 
judges); Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in 
Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 607–15 (2009) 
(analyzing court findings of inequitable conduct using statistics); Kevin Mack, 
Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing 
Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155 (2006) (discussing the 
frequency with which inequitable conduct is pled); Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, 
Note, Inequitable Conduct in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 160–64 (2005) (evaluating the number and success of 
frivolous inequitable conduct allegations); see also Donald R. Dunner, J. Michael 
Jakes & Jeffrey D. Karceski, A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit Patent 
Decisions: 1982–1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 156, 173 tbl.4 (1995) (examining 
inequitable conduct as part of a study into whether the Federal Circuit is pro-
patentee). 
 20. See Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen, & Ali Mojibi, The Federal 
Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1293, 1324–29 (2011) (reporting acts such as failing to disclose prior art patents 
and publications, failing to disclose experimental data, relying on false data, 
filing false affidavits, excluding inventors from an application, 
mischaracterizing art or other information, inappropriately paying a small 
entity fee, or inequitably seeking a petition to make special).  
UNENFORCEABILITY 1757 
most especially those patents found to be unenforceable after 
years of litigation) with other patents, both similarly situated and 
not. That is, we exploit the commonality among reported patent 
litigations—that they all involve patents—to isolate the 
characteristics of patents that are most likely to be held 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. By examining those 
characteristics and comparing them to characteristics of other 
sets of patents (unlitigated, litigated, invalid, obvious, and 
insufficiently described), we are able to draw some conclusions 
about the way inequitable conduct is working in the real world, 
and the role the doctrine plays in the patent system. 
What follows moves in three parts. In Part II we describe our 
analytical techniques in more detail, discussing the research 
design and the data we used for the study. In Part III we present 
our results, and provide our interpretation and analysis. Finally, 
in Part IV, we discuss the implications of our findings on the role 
of inequitable conduct as well as some future applications of the 
techniques we use in this project.  
II. Research Design and Data 
A. Research Design 
Our research question is whether the legal doctrine of 
inequitable conduct is (or is not) operating according to its 
theoretical basis in the patent law. That is, we want to explore 
whether inequitable conduct polices socially undesirable 
applicant behavior before the USPTO and thus helps to prevent 
fraud on the public.21 As we noted briefly above, we have chosen a 
research strategy that uses the patents involved in inequitable 
conduct cases as an instrument of measurement—rather than 
more conventional techniques related to case law analysis.22 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Michael Buschbach, An Improved Framework for Analyzing 
“Substantially Similar” Patent Claims with Respect to the Inequitable Conduct 
Defense, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 325, 332–33 (2009) (describing the way 
inequitable conduct provides a check on undesirable patent application 
behavior). 
 22. See supra Part I.  
1758 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1751 (2013) 
The impetus for this approach is threefold. First, although 
each patent granted is distinct, a large number of those 
distinctions (for example, subject matter, complexity, and 
prosecution history) are amenable to empirical characterization, 
and that data is readily available. Second, although patent 
litigations vary widely in terms of scope, complexity, 
jurisdictions, and so forth, there is at least one measurable 
commonality among them all: they must involve at least one 
patent (and that patent will itself be measurable, as noted above). 
And third, there is an increasing awareness among patent 
researchers that patents that are litigated are systematically 
different than patents that are not.23 Thus, it stands to reason 
that patents that are litigated with different intensities or based 
on different legal claims should also have systematically different 
characteristics.24 If the third point above is true (and we show it 
is, below),25 then the patents which are—after years of high-cost 
litigation—held unenforceable should be different from other 
patents, even other highly litigated patents. And those 
differences in patent characteristics should reflect something 
about the legal standards applied. 
Therefore our basic research design is to identify and 
characterize any measurable differences between patents that are 
held to be unenforceable due to inequitable conduct and other 
types of patents, and use those differences to evaluate the 
performance of the inequitable conduct doctrine. 
Of course, there is an initial question: how, hypothetically, 
might unenforceable patents differ from other patents? As 
discussed above, the theory of the doctrine of inequitable conduct 
is that it polices the relationship between patent applicants and 
the USPTO, and provides incentives to fully disclose known 
information and avoid misrepresentations.26 If this legal theory is 
                                                                                                     
 23. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465–
76 (2004) (comparing litigated patents and unlitigated patents).  
 24. Because patent litigation is a private enterprise, the differences among 
patents involved in litigation reflect choices made by patentees, accused 
infringers, and courts, which obviously are strongly affected by the legal 
standards applied.  
 25. See infra Part III.  
 26. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287–
89 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court embraced these reduced standards for intent 
and materiality to foster full disclosure to the PTO.”). 
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correct—if inequitable conduct performs this policing function—
then how would unenforceable patents differ from others? Our 
initial answer is that unenforceable patents should have 
characteristics that reveal forms of risk taking in prosecution.  
The answer follows readily from the policing theory of 
inequitable conduct. If inequitable conduct punishes those in 
patent prosecution who fail to disclose known information or 
intentionally fail to take due care to avoid material 
misrepresentations, then the prosecution of the patents (and thus 
eventually the issued patents) the doctrine identifies should 
reflect a greater risk of such behaviors. In addition, because the 
penalty for inequitable conduct is substantial—the involved 
patent as well as closely related patents may be held 
unenforceable, and attorneys involved may experience adverse 
professional consequences27—an applicant is most likely to risk 
inequitable conduct only when (at least in the applicant’s 
calculus) the reward of a patent grant is greater than the product 
of the probability of detection and the consequences of detection. 
This suggests that not all patent applications will be tainted by 
inequitable conduct. But if one assumes that applicants will risk 
deceptive behavior in some fraction of applications so that there 
will be some patents that are granted where the prosecution was 
tainted by inequitable conduct, then theory suggests those 
patents should be characterized by risky prosecution behavior. It 
follows that if the legal doctrine is working as theorized—so that 
patents tainted by inequitable conduct are systematically more 
likely to be held unenforceable—such patents should, we think, 
have characteristics that reveal risky prosecution behavior. Those 
characteristics may include: 
More parent applications and/or a longer pendency in 
prosecution. As other studies have shown, more parents and 
longer prosecution pendency are related to a higher likelihood of 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable 
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 766 (2009) (describing this); see 
also Brief for 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly and Company as 
Amici Curiae in Support of No Party at 2, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Nos. 04-CV-2123, 04-CV-3327, 04-CV-
3732, 04-CV-3117), http://www.patentlyo.com/ts.enbanc.elililly.pdf (discussing 
the personal impact of inequitable conduct claims on patent prosecutors at Eli 
Lilly). 
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litigation.28 But beyond that, applicants who use the continuation 
process are likely more confident in the value of the invention if 
patented (longer and more complex prosecutions cost more 
money), and are more willing to exploit the rules of patent 
prosecution for an advantage.29 Also consider that each filing 
with the USPTO represents an opportunity for inequitable 
conduct to occur, whether by failing to fully disclose or by 
misrepresentation. Thus, patents with longer and more complex 
prosecution histories should have a higher likelihood of being 
found unenforceable. 
Fewer disclosed prior art references. We think a paradigmatic 
example of risky prosecution behavior is less disclosure of prior 
art references. Of course, because there is no search requirement, 
the absence of disclosure of prior art is not itself a signal of illicit 
behavior,30 but we think that applicants who take higher risks in 
prosecution are extremely likely to disclose less than those who 
take lower risks—whether because of less searching for prior art 
(a form of willful blindness,31 perhaps) or simple nondisclosure of 
known art. Thus, patents showing fewer references should have a 
higher likelihood of unenforceability.32  
                                                                                                     
 28. See Allison et al., supra note 23, at 438 (adducing characteristics of 
patent value including small-entity status of the filer, number of claims, length 
of time in prosecution, number of patent-family members, number of forward 
citations, and patent age at the time of litigation).  
 29. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d. 867, 
874–76 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (discussing the propriety of this strategy).  
 30. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Nor does an applicant for patent, who has no duty to conduct a 
prior art search, have an obligation to disclose any art of which, in the [district] 
court’s words, he ‘reasonably should be aware.’”). 
 31. Willful blindness has two basic requirements: “First, the defendant 
must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists. 
Second, the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that 
fact.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011). 
 32. Disclosure seems to be ambivalent to value. On the one hand, it is 
commonly believed that a patent can be marginally strengthened by the citation 
to more prior art references. Thus, if there is a perception that a patent will be 
valuable, it makes sense to take on the cost of strengthening it by adding art to 
the file. On the other hand, failing to disclose art—especially art that is material 
to patentability—might facilitate issuance and help the patentee realize value. 
In addition, anxiety concerning what the examiner might do with submitted art 
could discourage citation to art in some cases. Although recent work presents 
results suggesting that to the extent applicants experienced this anxiety, it may 
not have been well founded. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & 
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More patent claims. More claims can often result in greater 
subject matter coverage and a greater ability to use a patent to 
affect competition. However, drafting and prosecuting larger 
numbers of claims is expensive.33 Additional claims take more 
time to draft and present more opportunities for the Patent Office 
to issue a rejection. Applicants may therefore be more likely to 
take on the cost of more claims when they have a stronger belief 
that the patent has value in the marketplace. Again, an 
expectation of higher value should correspond with additional 
risky behavior.  
Of course, we did not limit our data gathering to only 
characteristics that had support as indicators of patent value. We 
expect that the characteristics noted above will be the most 
distinct if the doctrine of inequitable conduct is operating as 
theorized. We discuss our data in more detail below. 
B. Data 
Five separate datasets of patents were created to supply the 
data necessary for this study. Except as otherwise described 
below, all patent data was obtained from that made public by the 
USPTO34 or the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
                                                                                                     
Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for 
Presumption of Validity 32 (Stan. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 401, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1656568## (studying the use of applicant-submitted prior art).  
It has also been argued that inequitable conduct doctrine encourages the 
overdisclosure of information to the Patent Office. See Cotropia, supra, note 27, 
at 770–72 (“[T]he doctrine incentivizes the patent applicant to err on the side of 
quantity.”); Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s 
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 770–75 (2011) (describing 
when patent applicants would choose disclosure over nondisclosure). These 
claims have yet to make contact with observations but suggest the possibility 
that applicants with an expectation of value for a nascent patent will take on 
the cost of searching for and disclosing more information to the Patent Office. 
See id. (offering predictions). 
 33. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 
(2002) (estimating the current administrative costs of obtaining a U.S. patent). 
 34. See Electronic Data Products, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/products/catalog/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 19, 2013) 
(providing public patent and trademark data) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Bulk USPTO data is also made available by a partnership 
between the USPTO and Google, and is hosted by Google. See USPTO Bulk 
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Patent Data Project.35 Official USPTO data in bulk form is 
readily available for all U.S. patents granted after January 1, 
1976.36 Patents issued before 1976, therefore, are not part of our 
datasets.  
Unenforceable patents. The data collection technique used for 
unenforceable patents has been discussed in detail elsewhere.37 
Briefly, a dataset of unenforceable patents was established by 
collecting every decision involving inequitable conduct made by 
the Federal Circuit, beginning with the creation of the court and 
ending May 27, 2010. The decisions were collected by searching 
the term “inequitable conduct” in the LEXIS “Federal Circuit, 
U.S. Court of Appeals” database, but the data was supplemented 
by a similar search of the Westlaw “U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (Cases)” database. The decisions returned were 
coded for whether the court issued a mandate of inequitable 
conduct. Multiple human coders were used and intercoder 
agreement was assessed by calculating Cohen’s Kappa.38 The 
value calculated was 0.944, which indicates nearly perfect 
agreement.39 Intercoder disagreements were identified and 
corrected. The patent numbers of unenforceable patents were 
collected based on information in the decisions. Given the 
limitation that patents had to be issued at least as recently as 
1976, our unenforceable patents dataset includes 95 patents.  
Invalid 112 patents. This dataset was constructed by 
collecting every decision involving enablement, written 
                                                                                                     
Downloads: Patents, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-
patents.html (last visited July 5, 2013) [hereinafter GOOGLE] (providing data) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. See Patent Data Project, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/ (last visited July 5, 2013) 
(providing data) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. See GOOGLE, supra note 34 (deriving a dataset). 
 37. See supra Part I (discussing data collection for unenforceable patents); 
see also Petherbridge et. al., supra note 20, at 1303–08 (describing data 
collection). 
 38. See Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 
EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37, 39–46 (1960) (describing the method of 
determining the coefficient of agreement between two judges). 
 39. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer 
Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977) (discussing 
kappa values); see also JOSEPH L. FLEISS, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND 
PROPORTIONS 218 (2d ed. 1981) (same).  
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description, or best mode. These are all requirements for 
patentability that have a statutory basis in 35 U.S.C § 112, ¶ 1 
(“112 patents”),40 made by the Federal Circuit, beginning with the 
creation of the court and ending June 11, 2012. The decisions 
were collected by querying the LEXIS “Federal Circuit, U.S. 
Court of Appeals” database, with the search terms: 35 U.S.C. /2 
112 and (“written description” or “enable” or “enablement” or 
“best mode”) and valid! or invalid!. The decisions returned were 
coded for whether the court issued a mandate of invalidity on a 
theory of lack of adequate disclosure. Multiple human coders 
were used and intercoder agreement was assessed. Cohen’s 
Kappa was calculated as 1.000. The patent numbers of invalid 
112 patents were collected based on information in the decisions. 
Given the limitation that patents had to be issued at least as 
recently as 1976, our invalid 112 patents dataset includes 80 
patents. 
Obvious patents. This dataset was constructed by collecting 
every decision involving obviousness (a requirement for 
patentability that has its statutory basis in 35 U.S.C § 103)41 
made by the Federal Circuit, beginning January 1, 1990, and 
ending June 15, 2012. Decisions issued between January 1, 1990, 
and May 25, 2005, were collected as reported in Petherbridge & 
Wagner.42 Briefly, the LEXIS Federal Circuit database was 
searched with the terms “patent and obvious.” Decisions issued 
between May 25, 2005, and June 15, 2012, were collected by 
querying the LEXIS “Federal Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals” 
database, with the search terms: “patent and atl4(obvious!) or 
atl3(nonobvious!).” Multiple human coders were used and 
intercoder agreement assessed. Cohen’s Kappa was calculated as 
0.98. The patent numbers of obvious patents were collected based 
on information in the decisions. Given the limitation that patents 
had to be issued at least as recently as 1976, our obvious patents 
dataset includes 235 patents.  
                                                                                                     
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
 41. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011). 
 42. See Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and 
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 2051, 2071–74 (2007) (describing research methods and listing 480 total 
records between January 1, 1990, and June 1, 2005, from which to collect data). 
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Litigated patents. Research about the patent system, and 
particularly patent litigation, has long been hampered by a lack 
of good data about litigated patents. To address this limitation, 
we attempted to discover all patents litigated from January 1, 
1976, through August 23, 2011. We used the relevant LEXIS 
database, which includes Patent Office litigation notices, as well 
as Westlaw-Litalert, which includes information from Derwent 
about which patents have been litigated. Approximately 
4,075,707 patents issued during the thirty-five-year period 
studied, and we discovered 36,594 distinct patents litigated 
during the period. That results in a litigation rate across the 
period of 0.90%. While the historical rate of patent litigation is 
unknown, it is commonly estimated to be about 1%.43 Assuming 
that estimate is correct, we believe we have collected at minimum 
a very substantial proportion of all patents litigated between 
1976 and 2011. From the 36,594 litigated patents, we randomly 
selected 1,000 for use as our dataset of litigated patents. In 
analyzing the data, we made no effort to remove unenforceable 
patents from the dataset of litigated patents. The reason is that 
unenforceable patents are so rare that it is unlikely they will 
appear in large enough numbers to be concerning in a randomly 
selected set of litigated patents.44  
Unlitigated patents. From a set of all patents issued between 
January 1, 1976, and August 23, 2011, we collected a random 
sample of 1,000 patents. Because of the very low rate of patent 
litigation, we made no effort to remove litigated or unenforceable 
patents from these data.  
Variables. For each patent in the datasets, we collected 
bibliographic data concerning the parameters along which our 
design hypothesizes that litigated patents might differ from 
unenforceable patents. Variables were collected using custom-
made Perl scripts, or custom-made python scripts operating on 
the original data sources; Table 1 lists these. 
                                                                                                     
 43. See Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy 
Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531, 548 (2000) 
(estimating litigation rates). 
 44. We checked anyway, and discovered two unenforceable patents in the 
litigated patents dataset.  
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Table 1: Data Variables 
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III. Results and Discussion 
The basic statistics for the variables in our datasets are 
shown in Table 2, below. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics, All Datasets 
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As Table 2 indicates, there are differences in the 
measurements for many of the variables across datasets. For 
example, unenforceable patents have significantly longer 
pendencies (overallpend) than litigated patents, and both 
unenforceable and litigated patents have longer pendencies than 
unlitigated patents. In addition, unenforceable patents have more 
claims (numclaims) and more parent applications (parents) than 
litigated patents, which in turn surpass unlitigated patents on 
both measures. Note that prior art citations (totalref) differ 
interestingly across datasets: unenforceable patents have far 
fewer citations to prior art than invalid, obvious, or invalid 112 
patents (though more than unlitigated patents). This will turn 
out to be important, and we return to this point later. 
Next, we developed a regression model to compare the 
differences between litigated and unlitigated patents. As noted in 
our discussion of the research design, there is increasing 
awareness among scholars about these differences, so this 
exercise is presented as both a check on our methods and a proof 
of the developing wisdom. Table 3 reports these results. 
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Table 3: Litigated vs. Unlitigated Patents 
 
Our findings in Table 3 are broadly consistent with other 
studies. Litigated patents differ quite substantially from 
unlitigated patents: Litigated patents have longer pendencies, 
more claims, cite more references, and are more likely to have a 
U.S. inventor. Drug and medical patents are also much more 
likely to be litigated than other types. Again, these findings are 
consistent with our methodological theory: patents that are the 
subject of litigation are measurably (and statistically 
significantly) different from those that are not. 
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The next step in our analysis was to assess whether what we 
call “intensely litigated patents”—those litigated to final 
judgment at the Federal Circuit—are likewise significantly 
different from litigated patents, and in turn unlitigated patents. 
Table 4 reports these results. 
Table 4: Intensely Litigated Patents vs. Unlitigated Patents, vs. 
Litigated Patents 
 
As with the model comparing litigated and unlitigated 
patents, we find statistically significant differences between 
intensely litigated patents and both litigated and unlitigated 
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patents along several dimensions. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
risk-associated explanatory variables more strongly distinguish 
intensely litigated patents from unlitigated patents than they do 
from litigated patents. Nevertheless, differences between 
intensely litigated patents and litigated patents are strongly 
significant. Intensely litigated patents (compared to litigated 
patents) are longer pending, have more claims, and are (again) 
overrepresented by drug and medical patents. Interestingly, 
although intensely litigated patents have, statistically, 
significantly more prior art references than unlitigated patents, 
this relationship does not hold for litigated patents. The reason 
for this is revealed by subsequent models, below.45 
In addition, the finding that intensely litigated patents are 
significantly different from patents that are merely the subject of 
litigation reveals that not all litigated patents are necessarily 
alike. This novel finding is encouraging in that it is consistent 
with our methodological expectations. It should, moreover, have 
implications for future work concerning litigated patents. 
Depending on the research question, it may be appropriate to 
account for the extent to which a patent is litigated in research 
design.46 
Table 5 reports how unenforceable patents compare to 
unlitigated patents, litigated patents, and invalid patents. Invalid 
patents, as we noted in Part III, are those patents that have been 
declared invalid by the Federal Circuit on the basis of 
obviousness (under 35 U.S.C. § 103), or lack of enabling 
disclosure, adequate description, or disclosure of best mode 
(under 35 U.S.C. § 112). 
  
                                                                                                     
 45. See tables infra Part III. 
 46. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value 
or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 11–12 (2009) (examining frequently litigated patents and describing a 
statistical analysis approach). 
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Table 5: Unenforceable Patents vs. Unlitigated, vs. Litigated, 
vs. Invalid 
 
Table 5 indicates that unenforceable patents have different 
characteristics from invalid patents. Although invalid patents 
and unenforceable patents are both litigated to a decision on 
appeal, unenforceable patents have a longer pendency and a 
greater number of claims (though the difference with the invalid 
patents is only marginally significant) than both litigated and 
invalid patents. There are two additional important observations in 
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Table 5. First, and most strikingly, the number of prior art 
references (totalref) shows clearly as a differentiating 
characteristic in the litigated and invalid models—meaning that 
unenforceable patents cite statistically significantly fewer prior 
art references than do litigated or invalid patents. In fact, 
unenforceable patents appear to cite prior art references at a 
level similar to that of unlitigated patents.47 Second, 
unenforceable patents also differ from invalid patents along 
subject matter lines: compared to invalid patents, unenforceable 
patents are more likely to be directed to innovations in chemistry, 
electronics, and mechanics than to innovations in drugs or 
computers.  
Finally, in order to explore further the differences between 
unenforceable patents and others—and thus evaluate the way the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct operates—we built a regression 
model comparing unenforceable patents to the other two datasets 
involving intensely litigated patents: those found invalid for 
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 at the Federal Circuit, and 
those found invalid for lack of disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 at 
the Federal Circuit. Table 6 reports these results. 
  
                                                                                                     
 47. All else being equal, this might indicate that unenforceable patents 
could be characterized as “accidentally litigated” patents. This notion is 
substantially undercut, however, by the fact that unenforceable patents pend 
significantly longer and have significantly more claims than unlitigated patents. 
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Table 6: Unenforceable Patents vs. Obvious, vs. Undisclosed 
 
Here again, perhaps the most striking finding is with respect 
to prior art references: unenforceable patents cite statistically 
significantly fewer prior art references than do obvious or 
undisclosed patents. Unenforceable patents, in addition, pend 
longer and have more claims than obvious patents. Unenforceable 
patents also appear to differ from 112 patents, although perhaps 
not as extremely. Unenforceable patents appear not to have more 
claims than such patents, nonetheless they do pend longer, and 
the difference in the number of cited prior art references remains 
strong.  
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IV. Implications and Discussion 
As discussed in Part II above,48 this project seeks to analyze 
the performance of the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct 
by exploiting differences between sets of patents affected by 
litigation. And primarily Tables 5 and 6 reveal a pattern of patent 
characteristics from which one can draw some inferences about 
the doctrine of inequitable conduct. Our discussion here proceeds 
as follows: First, we discuss the core finds of the data analysis—
in particular that patents held unenforceable have statistically 
significantly fewer citations to prior art than other similarly 
litigated patents—and consider what these findings suggest 
about the operational performance of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine in the real world of patent litigation. Second, we explore 
possible alternative explanations for our results. Third, we draw 
some tentative conclusions about how to think about the role of 
inequitable conduct in the patent system, based on our findings. 
And finally, we offer some thoughts on the potential for future 
research for the methods developed in this project. 
A. Our Results 
Given the policing theory of inequitable conduct doctrine, we 
hypothesized that if the doctrine aligned well with its theory, 
then unenforceable patents might be different than other patents. 
More specifically, we thought unenforceable patents would be 
both:  
1. Relatively more valuable than other patents (the 
risk/reward ratio means that the applicant must 
believe there is substantial value); and  
2. Characterized by risky behavior in prosecution. 
Perhaps the most revealing result of our study is that those 
patents found unenforceable have statistically significantly fewer 
citations to prior art than patents in other similarly tested 
groups. This is consistent with the doctrinal theory. In 
prosecution, applicants might sometimes risk later discovery of a 
                                                                                                     
 48. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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withheld reference in order to get valuable claims allowed. 
Unenforceable patents, moreover, not only distinguish 
themselves from all other patents litigated to any degree in terms 
of their lack of reference to prior art, but they are also apparently 
among the most complex patents in our data in that they surpass 
all patents, including all other intensely litigated patents, in 
length of pendency, and nearly all other patents in number of 
claims. No set of patents had significantly more claims than 
unenforceable patents. It thus appears that unenforceable 
patents, while being among the most complex patents we 
examined, nonetheless make reference to the fewest pieces of 
prior art. It is this juxtaposition of characteristics—which 
obviously does not itself reveal inequitable conduct—that is 
consistent with what we might expect to observe given the theory.  
Our findings are, therefore, consistent with the conclusion 
that inequitable conduct doctrine aligns well with its underlying 
theory. But we cannot claim an empirically airtight case. It is 
worth considering some of the explanations that might be 
available to describe why unenforceable patents, arguably the 
most complex set of patents we observe, reference the fewest 
pieces of prior art. 
B. Possible Alternative Explanations 
Although we think our results are most naturally interpreted 
in the manner described above, it is worth considering alternative 
explanations for the patterns of relationships our study reveals. 
Alternative 1: “Pioneering” patents are more likely to be 
(erroneously) found unenforceable. “Pioneering” patents—those 
directed to especially innovative ideas—might also be expected to 
cite less prior art, for the reason that they are significant 
technological advances, and thus have less relevant sources of 
prior art (and consequently fewer citations to prior art). So 
perhaps our results might reveal that such patents are 
particularly susceptible to being identified (perhaps erroneously) 
as unenforceable by litigation. We think this is unlikely. First, 
our findings also suggest that unenforceable patents are 
characterized by long prosecution pendency, which is not 
consistent with the idea that less prior art is available to deploy 
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against the application. Indeed, it suggests the opposite: One 
predicts that pioneering patents, while perhaps subject to greater 
scrutiny under § 10149 (for subject matter and perhaps utility) 
would be relatively easy to allow. The relative lack of art should 
result in short prosecution pendency, not encourage exceptionally 
long pending applications.50 Second, we think there is little 
reason to suggest that the process of determining inequitable 
conduct (in other words, determining materiality and intent) 
should disproportionately target pioneer patents. And third, our 
experience in reading many of the cases that describe inequitable 
conduct does not suggest that patents found unenforceable are 
especially novel or innovative.51  
Alternative 2: The intuition of the patent litigator. One 
possible explanation is that patent litigators sense patent 
characteristics, such as relatively few patent references, that 
suggest that the patent is particularly vulnerable to assertions of 
inequitable conduct—whether or not such conduct has occurred. 
They then aggressively act on this intuition, seeking to convince 
judges via the arts of advocacy and rhetoric that an applicant 
engaged in inequitable conduct. The basic idea here is that even 
in view of our results, we cannot rule out the possibility that we 
are observing some sort of artifact or flaw in the doctrine that 
defendants are able to exploit even when inequitable conduct has 
not genuinely occurred. We think this is somewhat unlikely; the 
unenforceable patents in our dataset were the subjects of 
extremely intense litigation, including an appeal to the Federal 
Circuit. Although lawyerly skill is clearly important, we doubt 
(though cannot definitively rule out) that it could systematically 
account for the patterns we find in our results. 
                                                                                                     
 49. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 50. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent 
Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1069 (2003) (“[I]t costs more to carry out 
more thorough prior art searches, and larger numbers of prior art references . . . 
correlate even more strongly with longer pendency times than the number of 
claims does.”).  
 51. See, e.g., Petherbridge et. al., supra note 20, at 1308–29 (examining the 
content of all federal circuit inequitable conduct opinions). 
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Alternative 3: Unobserved effects. As with all empirical 
analyses, there may well be important drivers to the selection of 
patents for unenforceability that we cannot measure, and thus 
cannot account for in our methods.  
C. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Generates Beneficial 
Incentives 
We think our results, on balance, paint a relatively positive 
picture of the inequitable conduct doctrine. The doctrine seems to 
be working as expected, targeting patents that are significantly 
different than other similarly tested patents—and different in 
ways that the theory of the doctrine as serving a policing function 
would predict. 
What we find most important about our findings, however, is 
that it allows us to conclude with some confidence that the 
inequitable conduct doctrine does not act randomly in the real 
world. There are indeed statistically significant differences in the 
characteristics of patents held unenforceable versus other types 
of patents, even those litigated in similar fashion. What that 
means is that the inequitable conduct doctrine is (or at least 
should be) generating incentives for certain behavior among 
patent applicants. If the converse were true, if the inequitable 
conduct doctrine appeared to apply randomly across patent 
characteristics, then the doctrine would not be generating any 
specific behavior other than generally reducing incentives to 
obtain patents.52  
What incentives do we think the doctrine is creating? It 
should encourage patent applicants to reduce the characteristics 
we identified above as associated with unenforceability: longer 
pendency, more claims, and fewer prior art references. Put 
another way, the findings show that the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct should be encouraging patentees to offer less complex 
patents (fewer claims), engage in simpler prosecution (lower 
pendency), and provide more prior art references. To be sure, 
there are other factors that may encourage this sort of behavior, 
                                                                                                     
 52. The intuition here is that if some n% of patents were held 
unenforceable at random, then the incentive to obtain a patent would be 
correspondingly reduced. 
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as well as factors pointing the other direction. But our results 
suggest that the doctrine should have a generally positive effect 
on the mix of incentives that drive patenting behavior. 
Thus, one implication of our study is that eliminating the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct may be a mistake. Patents held 
unenforceable are uniquely complex, pend for a long time, and 
cite less prior art. This is not, we think, a good combination; the 
doctrine is probably working reasonably well. 
In addition, we do not see in our results any clear need to 
tweak the doctrinal framework. Indeed we were surprised how 
well our findings aligned with the way that we expected the 
doctrine to work. This is not to say the doctrine is perfect, but 
that over the long run, it seems to be having a real-world impact 
in the direction that one would expect. 
It is worth acknowledging what our results are unlikely to 
reveal about inequitable conduct. As we noted above, there is a 
widely held—although empirically unverified—view that the 
doctrine is over-asserted in patent litigation. Our findings shed 
relatively little light on the assertion that inequitable conduct is 
so often alleged that there is a “plague” of inequitable conduct 
claims.53 We do not count assertions or attempt to measure the 
litigation costs of failed assertions and the ex-ante effects of the 
fear of being accused of inequitable conduct. The data presented 
here, therefore, does not reach the question of whether there are 
too many inequitable conduct allegations in patent cases. 
The most important thing these data cannot answer, 
perhaps, is whether the doctrine is efficient. That is, whether the 
types of behavior targeted by inequitable conduct could be 
addressed in more cost-effective ways. Any analysis of cost-
efficiency would necessarily have to account for the substantial 
costs of the doctrine in terms of litigation and prosecution 
incentives. So while it may be the case that inequitable conduct 
encourages beneficial applicant behavior, the doctrine might also 
create such large incentives for defendants to assert it that the 
incidence of assertions far outweighs the level that would make 
the doctrine effective from a cost–benefit standpoint. For 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing allegations of inequitable conduct as a “plague”); 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (same (quoting Burlington Industries, 849 F.2d at 1422)). 
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example, it might be that rather than use inequitable conduct as 
a policing mechanism to force better disclosure of prior art, the 
patent law should simply require more disclosure from 
applicants—a prior art search, perhaps.54 A search requirement 
would at least partially address our results (the relatively lower 
incidence of prior art citations).55 But the reality is that we do not 
have a search requirement; until we do, it appears that the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct can provide some of the desired 
behavioral incentives. 
Nonetheless, what our findings do suggest is that the 
inequitable conduct doctrine performs in the real world in a way 
that aligns well with the doctrine’s theoretical purpose. In a 
sense, this does respond to the criticism we noted above: the 
doctrine appears to be working as intended. Patents are not 
randomly being declared unenforceable. Thus, there is, we think, 
evidence of value in the doctrine from our results. 
D. Implications for Future Work 
Another important aspect of our findings is that they suggest 
that our methodological approach to measuring the performance 
of the inequitable conduct doctrine—by studying the patterns of 
difference among the patents on which it operates—has promise 
in other areas. By exploiting the commonality of patents among 
patent litigations, as well as the easily measurable 
characteristics of patents, we think there are new insights 
available into doctrinal performance across patent law. This is 
not to suggest that more traditional ways of evaluating case law 
are not useful, but that the approach described in this paper may 
represent a new way of thinking about how patent doctrine meets 
patent policy. 
                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing amendment to title 
35 of the United States Code to require an applicant to a business method 
patent to disclose the extent to which the applicant searched for prior art). 
 55. See Kevin M. Baird, Note, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the 
USPTO or Business as Usual?, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 347, 360–62 
(2001) (suggesting requiring a mandatory prior art search by the patentee). 
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V. Conclusion 
Inequitable conduct doctrine engenders stronger feelings 
than perhaps any other patent doctrine. It is at the center of a 
battle for control over the substantive law of patentability that 
pits patent applicants against the courts and the Patent Office. 
The details of the doctrine are taught in every serious patent 
course offered by every serious law school. Yet somehow, 
remarkably little is known about whether there is a real-world 
link between inequitable conduct doctrine and patent policy.  
This study takes a step towards unfurling some of the 
complexity of inequitable conduct law and policy. It empirically 
examines patents that have been determined unenforceable for 
inequitable conduct and reports evidence that unenforceable 
patents are significantly different from other types of patents. 
Unenforceable patents have significantly longer pendency, more 
parent applications, and contain more claims. Unenforceable 
patents also cite fewer prior art references. Based on these 
observations, this report raises empirically grounded hypotheses 
concerning inequitable conduct that should be useful to legal 
scholars and practitioners.  
